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“Surveying History at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.”

I. Introduction

There now exists a large body of scholarship assessing international and national
criminal trials for alleged mass violations of international humanitarian law. One debate
in this literature evaluates the degree to which these trials have examined the origins
and causes of violations, and provided an accurate historical record of the context of the
crimes. By and large, historians and legal commentators are critical of law’s ability to
engage in historical inquiry. Liberal legalists have maintained that historical discussion
of the underlying factors in a conflict defeats the ends of justice, understood as a fair
hearing of the charges against one individual (Arendt 1965; Todorov 1996). Scholars
from the law and society tradition have highlighted the distinctive characteristics of
history and law, arguing that law and history are incompatible since they employ
distinctive epistemological methods (Evans 2002; Rousso 2000; Sadkovich 2002); that
law’s own rules and procedures create a reductive template that actually distorts
historical and social realities (Golsan 2000b); that law’s minimal regard for context
means it is inevitably partial with respect to the historical record (Geertz 1983; Bloxham
2001; Marrus 1997; Minow 1998; Mertus 2000) or that the courtroom is just plain
boring in its excessive concern with meticulous procedural rectitude and therefore
represents the wrong platform for revealing historical truths (Osiel 2000). A few
countervailing views have emerged, and Lawrence Douglas (2001) has maintained that
at Nuremberg newly minted legal categories propelled historical inquiry. By and large,
though, the majority have formed a low opinion of law’s capacity to conduct historical
analysis.

With the recent emergence of an array of international criminal justice institutions
including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY, established
1993), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR, 1994) and the International
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Criminal Court (ICC, 2002), new discussions have coalesced around the case law and
jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals (Cassese 2003, Dörmann 2003, Schabas
2001, 2009), the international geo-politics of the Tribunals (Hazan 2004, Moghalu 2008,
Peskin 2008), the impact (or lack thereof) of the Tribunals in the countries and regions
concerned (Tosid 2007, Clarke 2009), and the effect of legal judgments on survivors of
violence (Nettelfield 2010, Stover 2005). Accounts of the internal working of
international courts have also started to be published, either in memoirs by key actors
(Goldstone 2000, Del Ponte 2009) or in ethnographic studies by social scientists (Hagan
2003). As yet, there has been very little evaluation of the historical accounts of armed
conflicts produced by contemporary international justice institutions, and what there is
has tended to focus on the judgments written by judges at the end of cases (Donia 2004,
Turkovid 2003, Wilson 2005, 2007).

While providing important insights on the place of historical evidence in published case
law, these discussions can only infer conclusions about the relevance and weight given
to historical evidence in reaching a judgment. Despite some excellent work in the early
stages of the Tribunal (Hagan 2003), there is still precious little information on the
international criminal legal proceedings as a dynamic decision-making process, and on
the complex interactions between the strategies and understandings of the legal actors.
As Jens Meierhenrich (2008:702) observes, while we have a solid grasp of the
jurisprudential dimensions of international courts and tribunals, we know “close to
nothing” about them as complex social institutions made up of different groups with a
variety of goals and assumptions. To answer our questions about the relationship
between international law and regional histories, what is needed is empirical research
on how prosecutors and defense attorneys strategize in their use of historical evidence
in the Trial Chamber, and what expert witnesses called by prosecution or defense hope
to convey in their oral testimonies or written reports. This is the lacuna in the literature
that this research seeks to fill.
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By surveying key actors in cases at the ICTY, the longest functioning ad hoc tribunal,
about their intentions, motivations and perceptions, we might arrive at a greater
understanding of their strategies and their assessment of the overall value and influence
of historical testimony. Since the survey is anonymous, actors may be less constrained
in expressing their own candid assessments than in public statements or interviews.
Furthermore, while analysis of trial transcripts provides worthwhile information about
how historical debates transpired in the Trial Chamber, by undertaking the discussion
outside of the rough-and-tumble adversarial process of the courtroom, a more balanced
evaluation might be forthcoming from the parties. Finally, in the survey format,
respondents are not asked to tie their responses to a specific case, and this might
permit them to base their answers on a more global assessment of the Tribunal’s legacy
since it began over 17 years and 161 indictments ago. As the Tribunal comes to the end
of its term (probably in 2014), such “exit surveys” of former Tribunal staff and defense
team members can comprise an integral part of the appraisal of the ICTY’s work.

In order to augment what can be learned from case law and trial transcripts, and to
furnish new insights into the perspective of legal actors with respect to the debate on
legal histories of mass crimes, we turned to three categories of participants in the
process—ICTY staff members, members of defense teams, and external expert
consultants/witnesses—with the following three overarching themes in mind:


Motivations: What do prosecutors and defense attorneys seek to achieve by
including historical evidence in a case? How do they use such evidence to build
their theory of a case? How do they understand the intentions of the opposing
party? What relationship do they see between historical evidence and other
aspects of the legal case and other forms of evidence? Are international trials
more or less conducive than their national counterparts to admitting historical
testimony?



Courtroom Consequences: How is historical evidence received by the judges?
How do judges decide between opposing views of history and are they perceived
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as tilting towards one party or the other in their deliberation? Is oral testimony
more effective than written, and are defense and prosecution witnesses
perceived to be equally well prepared?


External Outcomes: Has the Tribunal provided an adequate account of the
origins, causes and processes of conflict in the former Yugoslavia? Have
historical discussions enhanced or undermined the Tribunal’s legitimacy in the
former Yugoslavia?

In designing a survey of former ICTY staff, defense team members and external expert
consultants/witnesses on historical matters, we were attuned to areas where a
consensus or strong divergences seemed likely. While we understand the ICTY to be a
‘hybrid’ international criminal tribunal that combines elements of Anglo-American
criminal law and the Continental civil-law system, ICTY trials are still propelled by the
adversarial process and as such, we were naturally interested in comparing the
responses of persons working on the prosecution and defense side. Another potential
fault line lies between lawyers and others working within the legal process, on the one
hand, and “non-legal” participants such as expert witnesses, who are largely based in
academic institutions, although experts are usually called by one of the contending
parties, rather than as independent parties by the ICTY judges.

Before outlining the survey’s methods, results and analysis, it is necessary to set out the
legal framework under which historical expert witness testimony is admitted in the ICTY
courtroom. Two features are worth noting here: that international criminal tribunals
have adopted a lenient approach to admitting evidence that is more comparable to the
civil-law system and in sharp contrast to Anglo-American common law; and second, that
the ICTY’s approach to historical evidence changed over time, requiring written as well
as live testimonial submissions on historical matters.
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Expert witness testimony at the ICTY is governed by a number of related rules of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence1, beginning with Rule 89(C): “A Chamber may admit
any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value,” with the main grounds
for exclusion being “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to
ensure a fair trial *Rule 89(D)+.” Rule 94bis authorizes either party to tender an expert
statement, after which time the other party has thirty days to indicate whether it wishes
to cross-examine the witness, and whether it challenges the qualifications of the witness
and the relevance of their report, in whole or in part.

Unlike in the common law tradition, international criminal courts operate without an
explicit hearsay rule. As in civil-law courts, there is no concern that a jury might be
misled since there is no jury, and it is assumed that ICTY judges are competent to
distinguish between reliable and unreliable evidence. In Tadid, the ICTY Trial Chamber
rejected a motion filed by defense counsel seeking to exclude hearsay evidence as a
general rule, affirming that the judges are able “by virtue of their training and
experience, to hear evidence in the context in which it has been obtained and accord it
appropriate weight. Thereafter, judges determine the relevance, reliability, and
probative value of the evidence relying upon the “context and character of the evidence
in question.”2 The Tribunal is guided in admitting hearsay evidence “by the
truthfulness, voluntariness and trustworthiness of the evidence.”3

Over time, the ICTY became more, not less, flexible in its rules admitting expert
evidence, in part a result of the acute pressure on the Tribunal by the United Nations

1

Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ICTY), UN Doc IT/32, adopted 11 Feb. 1994. At the time of

writing, there have been 44 revisions to the RPE.
2

Prosecutor v. Tadid, Decision on the Defense Motion on Hearsay. ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-T . 5

August 1996, cited in Blaskid §28.
3

Tadid §16

8
Security Council to shorten the length of trials.4 After 1998, a number of amendments
to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence signaled a shift away from the common law
adversarial model in the direction of the Continental civil-law system: Rule 92 bis and
Rule 94bis permitted the submission of written statements by experts, and evidence
could be admitted into a case without being led in the Trial Chamber and in the absence
of cross-examination, although either adversarial party could object and request crossexamination. Together, Rule 92bis and Rule 94bis allowed prosecutors and defense
attorneys to submit enormous quantities of scholarly reports, books and articles, as well
as non-governmental organization reports, films and videos. The documentary basis of
cases swelled to barely-manageable proportions during this period; for instance, in
Kordid and Čerkez the prosecution tendered 2721 exhibits, with the defense submitting
1643 exhibits.5

In 2002, the ICTY developed a “completion strategy” that subordinated the legal process
to a strict principle of expeditiousness.6 The rise of what Máximo Langer (2005:835)
terms the “managerial judging model” granted more authority to judges to manage
their cases aggressively in the pre-trial and trial phases. Rule 65ter requires prosecutors
to file a witness list, a document list and a list of contested matters and admissions.
Judges can select which witnesses to call and limit their testimony under rules 73bis and
73ter. Rule 90F&G give judges control over witness cross-examination to “avoid
needless consumption of time.” Trial Chamber decisions reinforced increased judicial
authority, for instance, the Kordid decision in October 2000 prohibiting the prosecution
from leading any evidence on “peripheral and background issues” in its rebuttal of the
4

ICTY Judge Patricia Wald (2001:549) wrote that the “new Rules sharply respond to the problem

of lagging trials.”
5

Kordid and Čerkez (IT-95-14/2) Case Information Sheet

http://www.un.org/icty/glance/kordic.htm Last accessed 10 August, 2009.
6

Report on the Judicial Status of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

and the Prospects for Referring Certain Cases to National Courts, U.N. Doc S/2002/678 (2002).
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defense case. 7 Judges thus gained the means to pare down cases drastically, and
regularly ordered prosecutors to drop a specific number of indictments or cut their
cases by an arbitrary number such as 25-30%.8 Defense attorneys embraced these
changes, saying that prosecutors regularly over-indicted. When prosecutors protested,
judges ruled that any time spent addressing an objection would be subtracted from the
time allotted to the party making the objection.9

While on the one hand, judges gained ever greater powers to restrict expert witnesses’
testimony and cross-examination, the new evidentiary regime allowed more latitude for
the parties to tender background and historical evidence. In practice, what happened in
any given ICTY trial depended on the nature of the case, the charges against the accused
and the inclination of the judges on the bench. Overall, however, after 2002
prosecutors called background expert witnesses rather less than before, and in a more
targeted fashion, favoring instead a more conventional crime-based approach. In the
pre-trial phase, the judges became more interventionist, reducing the scope of
prosecution cases and in particular, limiting expert witness testimony and historical
discussions. Defense cases were usually handled with a lighter touch, and defense
counsel continued to call extensive historical expert witnesses at the ICTY. In sum, the
role and scope of historical inquiry has varied widely during the life of the Tribunal and
its use by the legal parties has shifted from the prosecution in the earlier phases to the
defense as the Tribunal nears completion.

7

Mundis (2001:376)

8

On 14 November 2006, the Trial Chamber reduced the time previously allotted to the

prosecution in the Prlid case by more than a quarter. In a Decision on 21 November 2006, the
prosecution was given until December 4th to reduce the scope of the indictment against
Momčilo Perisid by “at least a third.”
9

See Prlid Trial Chamber Decision of 14 November, 2006.
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II. Methodology and the Survey Instrument

After the survey was developed, a preliminary version was reviewed by the Center for
Survey Research and Analysis at the University of Connecticut. The modified version
was tested on a focus group of six individuals who were former ICTY staff and consultant
expert witnesses that were not included in the survey. The focus group encouraged us
to define more fully certain terms such as “historian” and “historical evidence”. We
included a fuller definition in the survey preamble and on the Internet page linked to
the survey, which explained the rationale for the research project.

The final survey questionnaire was divided into two parts. Part 1 elicited information
about the background of respondents, the organ of the ICTY (including defense) with
which the respondent was last associated, the form and length of the respondent’s
participation in the work of the ICTY, the nature of the respondent’s professional
activities at the time when s/he first became associated with the ICTY and the
respondents’ familiarity with the former Yugoslavia and criminal justice systems prior to
that association. We chose not to request information regarding
ethnic/national/religious affiliation in the Balkans; this would generally not apply to ICTY
staff, and only to some defense attorneys and expert witnesses, and we judged that
numbers of responses would be insufficient to support conclusions. The primary focus
of this investigation was rather on comparisons among the parties to the legal process,
and between legal and non-legal actors. Who are our respondents? The chart below
indicates their occupational background before their association with the Tribunal:10

10

Approximately 60% in the “Other” category properly belong in one of the Criminal Justice

System categories, as a judge, prosecutor or defense attorney. The remainder included a
military lawyer, a number of journalists and graduate students.
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Where did you work prior to working for, or with, the Tribunal?

16%
31%

Criminal Justice System-Defense
Attorney (31%)
Criminal Justice System-Prosecutor
(5%)
Criminal Justice System-Judge (0%)
Police (10%)
Military (3%)

7%

National Government Agency (5%)
18%

5%
0%
4%

5% 3%

11%

United Nations or International
Agency (4%)
University or College (18%)
Non-Governmental Organization
(7%)
Other (please specify) (16%)

Figure 1

Part 2 covered the substantive issues addressed by the survey and was comprised of 36
questions grouped under 22 headings. The format varied between multiple choice (or
multi-value) and true-false. This was done to avoid respondent fatigue and ensure that
as many persons as possible would complete the survey. Although multiple choice (or
multi-value) questions allow for more articulated results and the possibility for the
“neutral” category to draw more responses, we judged that the benefit derived from
varying the question format outweighed the limitations.

For most topics, we balanced questions related to the prosecution and the defense; if
one question requested evaluation of evidence led by the prosecution, another would
request an analogous evaluation of evidence led by the defense. This was done not only
on grounds of objectivity, but also because we anticipated, in light of the ICTY’s
adversarial proceedings, that respondents’ perceptions of the use of historical evidence
in those proceedings might well vary in this dimension. The final open-ended question
invited respondents to provide any comments that they chose.
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Considering the highly contested nature of the Tribunal’s work and the adversarial
character of its legal proceedings, we reflected on the ways in which we could ensure
objectivity and neutrality. Thus, we acknowledged at least four distinct, albeit related,
aspects of objectivity.

First, the disposition and background of the investigators. It should be noted that
Andrew Corin was employed in the Leadership Research Team of the Office of the
Prosecutor of the ICTY between June 1999 and January 2008. During that time, he
actively assisted the prosecution through participation in basic research, focused
investigations and trial preparation. He also participated as an author of expert reports
and, on one occasion, as an expert witness.

Second, we also considered the relative independence of the investigators. Both
Richard Wilson and Andrew Corin maintain professional and/or personal acquaintances
with members of the ICTY staff and defense teams. Throughout this investigation,
however, neither has had any affiliation with the ICTY or any other affiliation that would
affect their neutrality.

A third issue relates particularly to fact-finding in adversarial situations, in which it is
necessary to ensure that all perspectives and parties are sufficiently represented,
corresponding to the legal principle of audi alteram partem. We sought to fulfill this
requirement in designing the survey, defining the pool of prospective participants, and
in soliciting and encouraging sufficient participation from all relevant groups of
prospective participants.

Fourth, we sought to ensure that the appropriate spectrum of fields of expertise was
consulted. In the direct investigation of war crimes and crimes against humanity, this is
a necessary, albeit oft-overlooked, condition of objectivity. In the form of metainvestigation that we were carrying out, focused as it was on a particular topic, it might
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appear less relevant. However, we judged that it would qualitatively enhance the
objectivity, and thus also the significance, of our results if we could achieve a balance of
professional perspectives, both legal and non-legal, among our respondents. Similarly,
it may also be noted that the fields of training and experience of the three investigators
are largely complementary, and include both internal and external perspectives on the
ICTY.

One limitation to the accessibility of the survey for prospective participants, and thus
potentially impacting its objectivity, concerns language. While the use of English may
have limited access for some potential respondents, it eliminated any possibility for
ambiguous interpretation due to issues of translation. Moreover, as potential
respondents were highly educated, we judged that the number of such persons lacking
sufficient knowledge of English would be sufficiently limited so as not to overly skew the
survey’s results. For the final open-ended question, we invited respondents to provide
their comments in one of several languages, including those of the former Yugoslavia.

Our greatest challenge arose in compiling the pool of potential participants and securing
the participation of a sufficient number of respondents. We initially anticipated
soliciting participation from all members of three groups: staff members of ICTY organs
(Prosecutor, Chambers, Registry); defense team members; and external experts who
participated in the ICTY’s work through testimony, public-domain reports, or publicly
known consultation for the prosecution or defense, including the defense for accused
from various national/ethnic groups. Our goal was to obtain the broadest possible range
of perspectives, both legal and non-legal.

Defining a desired pool of participants proved less challenging than securing the
participation of a sufficient number of such persons. We hoped that the ICTY would
assist us through the minimal step of informing staff members through e-mail of the
existence of the survey. This would have ensured access for participants from across the
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spectrum of roles and perspectives represented in the various organs of the ICTY. The
ICTY, however, declined to assist. To avoid any possibility of placing current staff
members in a delicate position, or inadvertently to jeopardize the confidentiality of
United Nations information, we ultimately chose to actively solicit the participation only
of former Tribunal staff members. In the absence of any public domain lists of ICTY staff,
present or former, we identified names and contact information of potential
participants through personal recollections, published sources such as the domain ICTY
Weekly Bulletins for the years 1996-2004, and searches of selected trial transcripts.
These restrictions severely limited the pool of potential participants from the ranks of
persons who had served as ICTY staff members. We were ultimately able to secure the
participation of a sufficient number of erstwhile staff members from the Office of the
Prosecutor. Responses from former staff members of the Registry and Chambers,
however, were judged insufficient to allow for significant comparison, and we
reluctantly excluded them from the analysis.

Securing the participation of defense team members proved less difficult. The
Association of Defense Counsel maintains a public website with a list of names and
contact information of members. This list, together with other information discovered
through searching other public-domain sources, allowed us to contact a sufficient
number of defense team members to allow for significant results. There exists no
master list of external expert consultants, nor do there exist public-domain witness lists
for most ICTY cases, so we found ourselves in much the same situation as in regard to
ICTY staff members. We therefore applied the same methodology and rules to
identifying these individuals. Finally, we published a call for participation on the survey
website, directed to former ICTY staff members, members of defense teams, and expert
consultants. In an attempt to achieve a sufficiently large and balanced set of responses
we received a joint endorsement by both Richard Goldstone, the first Prosecutor of the
ICTY, and Michael Karnavas, President of the Association of Defense Counsel Practicing
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Before the ICTY. We published this endorsement on the survey Internet page and
included it in the prenotification letter that was sent to prospective participants.

In total, 351 email invitations to participate in the survey were sent out. The largest
group approached were members of defense teams (201). Another 116 invitations were
sent to former ICTY staff from the Office of the Prosecutor, Registry and Chambers.
Finally, we invited 34 consultant experts for the prosecution and defense, most from
academic institutions in North America and Europe, including the former Yugoslavia.
The total number of responses collected was 75, indicating a response rate of 21%. Six
incomplete responses were excluded from the analysis, leaving 69 responses. hat final
figure was used to calculate a margin of error of 12%.11

There was an approximate parity in responses between members of defense teams (25)
and staff from the Office of the Prosecutor (31). Responses from external expert
consultants (13), although a smaller population, were judged sufficient for inclusion in
the analysis. Responses from staff of the Chambers and Registry were insufficient to
support conclusions, and these categories were excluded from our analysis of the
results. While recognizing that these numbers are relatively small, we hope that they
may nevertheless be sufficiently indicative to initiate a scholarly discussion on the uses
of historical evidence at the ICTY and other international criminal tribunals, and might
serve as a pilot study for future large-sample surveys. We decided to report our results
in percentages rather than raw numbers so as to facilitate comparison between the

11

We calculated Margin of Error (MOE) based on a confidence level of 95% (α=0.05),

determined as follows: we estimate that the total population of our participants is less than
10,000, but we used a conservative figure of 20,000 for our estimates. We assume the response
distribution to be normal for the data we have collected. Using N=69, based upon our analysis,
we find the margin of error to be 11.5 %. In order to be conservative regarding our inferences,
we use a MOE of 12% in this study.
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three main respondent groups—prosecutors, defense attorneys and expert witnesses
for the defense and prosecution.

III. What is the Legal Relevance of Historical Evidence?

This section reviews those survey questions directed towards the specifically legal
motivations for introducing historical evidence in a trial. In assessing the legal rationales
for historical inquiry, we begin with the observation that there is no mandate to
document the prior history of an armed conflict anywhere in the two UN Resolutions
that established the ICTY in 1993. Therefore prosecutors and defense attorneys are not
compelled by a formal mandate to write history, nor should we assume that they are
necessarily committed to the inherent value of historical reflection for its own sake.
However, all have an interest in advancing the most persuasive legal argument possible
and the question becomes whether historical evidence is seen as assisting them in
achieving that goal.

Our most general survey question on the relevance of history in international criminal
trials asked survey participants to respond to the statement: “Without historical
context, individual criminal acts do not appear to make sense.” A majority of
respondents (63%) either agreed or strongly agreed, 27% disagreed or strongly
disagreed, 9% were neutral and 1% expressed no opinion. Disaggregating the figures
revealed that prosecutors and defense counsel were equally convinced of the relevance
of historical context, and they agreed or strongly agreed with the statement at a rate of
61% and 60% respectively. These figures indicate a relatively high commitment among
ICTY legal actors to using historical context to understand alleged crimes. Furthermore,
historical evidence is valued equally by all parties in international criminal trials.

17
Widespread consensus between the parties also existed on the question of the type of
criminal trial that is more likely to include historical evidence.

Which type of criminal trial is more likely to include historical evidence?

11%

International Criminal
Tribunals 80%

8%

Domestic trials in national
justice systems 1%

1%

International and domestic
trials are about the same in
this regard 8%
No opinion 11%
80%

Figure 2

This invites the question—what specific features of international criminal legal
proceedings demand more historical evidence? We formulated a list of survey
questions addressing the nature of the crimes committed during the armed conflict in
the former Yugoslavia that compelled historical inquiry (e.g., their complexity or
widespread character), and/or whether the need arose more from legal imperatives
resulting from the categories of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
ICTY legal actors agreed that the character of the crimes had a strong impact on the use
of historical evidence and moreover, there were no sharp disagreements between
defense counsel and prosecutors, whose responses were within 5-7% of one another.
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Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.
When trials at the ICTY include historical evidence, they do so because:
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
No Opinion
The crimes were
The crimes were more
committed over a longer widespread and systematic
period of time than most
than most conventional
conventional domestic
domestic crimes.
crimes.

The crimes were more
complex than most
conventional domestic
crimes.

Figure 3

However, some strong divisions on the significance of historical elements of the Balkans
conflict emerged. One highly controversial debate during the conflict and in the ICTY’s
trials concerned the degree to which the alleged crimes were motivated by deep
historical animosities.
When trials at the ICTY include historical evidence, they do so because the
crimes committed were motivated by deep historical animosities.

8%

42%

50%

Figure 4

True
False
No opinion
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Unlike the questions considered thus far, no clear majority view was established.
Intriguingly, prosecution and defense team members did not diverge widely in their
responses, agreeing with the question at a similar level (51% and 46% respectively).
Experts (both the prosecution and defense) overwhelmingly (77%) rejected the “deep
historical animosities” explanation of the conflict. It appears that in the minds of ICTY
actors, the intrinsic attributes of the crimes brought before the ICTY—their complexity,
their widespread and systematic nature, but not their motivation by a longstanding
animus—impelled the Tribunal to consider their historical underpinnings. Our preferred
explanation/conjecture is that the ambivalence regarding the relevance of “deep
historical animosities” results from the mixed consequences for criminal responsibility in
leadership cases. If the crimes drew from adamantine antipathies, then the prosecution
could argue that the crimes were foreseeable, intensifying the culpability of leaders that
made inflammatory speeches or armed their supporters. On the other hand, historical
inter-group hatred could support a “chaos defense” whereby leaders were unable to
restrain spontaneous violence that erupted at the grassroots. Both positions have been
extensively argued by both parties in cases heard at the ICTY.12

Turning now to how historical evidence is shaped by the legal requirements contained
within the categories of international criminal law, the pictured is more mixed than with
explanations that refer to the nature of the crimes as considered above. A significant
majority of participants saw a correlation between the inclusion of historical evidence
and the collective dimensions of criminal categories such as genocide and persecution.
12

A chaos defense has been a feature in numerous trials of political leaders including Radoslav

Brđanin, Momčilo Krajisnik, Mido Stanišid and Stojan Župljanin. The foreseeable consequences
of actions is a prominent feature of the prosecution indictment against Bosnian Serb leader
Radovan Karadžid presently appearing in the trial chamber. The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžid.
Prosecution’s Marked-Up Indictment. With Appendix A. Case IT-95-5/18-PT. 19 October 2009.
e.g., §10, §39, §43, §50, §59.
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Prosecutors (77%) were more likely to endorse the view than defense attorneys (60%).
Expert witnesses showed least support for specifically legal explanations, with only a
slender majority (53%) in favor.
When trials at the ICTY include historical evidence, they do so because
genocide and crimes against humanity have a collective dimension that
requires a broader historical analysis.
70%

65%

60%
50%
40%
30%

25%

20%

10%

10%
0%
True

False

No opinion

Figure 5

One unique dimension of international tribunals compared with national justice systems
is that none of the judges are from the countries where the crimes were committed. A
majority (58%) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: “Prosecutors lead
historical evidence in the Trial Chamber to give judges a sense of the motivation for the
crimes.” 25% disagreed or strongly disagreed, 14% took a neutral position and 3% gave
no opinion. Disaggregating the figures revealed a divergence between the prosecution
and expert witnesses on the one hand and the defense on the other: 73% of prosecutors
and 69% of expert witnesses agreed or strongly agreed with the statement versus only
28% of defense attorneys. One prosecution expert witness reflected at the end of the
survey, “While those testifying as expert witnesses…come to their task equipped with a
body of knowledge about the region, its history, language and cultures, the judges and
those lawyers…in most cases begin their work at the tribunal almost totally uneducated
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on these matters. From remarks heard in court and encountered in written submissions
and judgments, one gets the impression that some of the judges and lawyers may still
be shaky in their grasp of basic facts and background information, even after having
served on more than one case at the ICTY.”

A number of questions focused on each of the parties to ICTY trials and their specialized
strategies for using historical evidence. We felt this to be necessary since, even though
historical expert witnesses may strive for objectivity and neutrality, they are after all
included in the process to further the line of argument of one party or the other.13
Stated plainly, their very presence is a function of the adversarial process of the
international criminal trial, and this may influence the scope and rationale of the
historical evidence introduced. Indeed the survey did turn up assertions of distortion,
bias and cynical misuse of historical evidence in the ICTY Trial Chamber. One
prosecution respondent wrote, “Under the adversarial system, trial lawyers prefer a
version of history that supports their case (they are not looking for objective (?) truth)….
There is a tendency to produce ‘cooked history’.” Defense respondents seemed
particularly aggrieved: “Testimony by ‘historians’ in many, if not all, of these trials, has
been used itself to manipulate and mold the view of which ethnic group is bad,
according to which ethnic group has been the victim. There is no consistency. If the
Muslims are the victims, then the history is manipulated to show that either the Serbs
or the Croats are the bad guys from an historical perspective, and vice versa.”

Seeking to comprehend prosecutors’ specific reasons for engaging historical expert
witnesses, the survey asked about the degree have prosecutors used historical evidence
in the Trial Chamber to assist in creating their theory of the case, where the theory is
the “particular line of reasoning …(that brings) together certain facts of the case in a
logical sequence and correlates them in a way that produces in the decision-maker’s

13

Unless called as expert witnesses by the judges, which seldom occurs.
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mind a definite result or conclusion favored by the advocate.”14 In plainer terms, the
theory is the overarching story that integrates the “what happened” with the “why it
happened”—the motives behind what happened.

To what degree have Prosecutors used historical evidence in the Trial Chamber to assist in creating
their theory of the case?
70%

59%

60%

50%

40%

30%

30%

20%
11%
10%

0%

0%
A great deal

Somewhat

Not at all

No opinion

Figure 6

What particular aspects of the prosecution’s theory of case are being enhanced? When
presented with the statement “Prosecutors lead historical evidence in the Trial Chamber
in order to give a sense of the motivation for the crimes,” 57% agreed or strongly
agreed, 14% were neutral and 24% disagreed or strongly disagreed, with 3% expressing
no opinion. When disaggregated, these figures show a more variegated picture, with
74% of respondents from the Office of the Prosecutor and 69% of expert witnesses
(both prosecution and defense) either agreeing or strongly agreeing. Only 28% of
defense attorneys agreed and 0% expressed strong agreement. Therefore we can
14

Black’s Legal Dictionary 2006.
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conclude that for a sizeable majority of prosecutors surveyed, historical evidence speaks
to the mental state of the accused, known as mens rea in criminal law.

Reviewing numerous ICTY trial judgments, it is apparent that prosecutors are more likely
to turn to historical evidence to illustrate the mental state of the accused when
genocide is charged. There are specifically legal reasons for this, as proving genocide
requires the prosecution to demonstrate “special” or “specific” intent, defined as “a
particular state of mind or a specific intent with respect to the overall consequence of
the prohibited act.”15 ICTY prosecutors have struggled to prove special intent to commit
genocide. In 2010, 17 years after the ICTY was founded, there is still no standing
conviction for committing genocide in the former Yugoslavia upheld on appeal. In cases
such as Blagojevid, Brđanin, Krstid and Krajišnik, Trial or Appeals Chamber judges found
that the prosecution had not demonstrated the requisite level of special intent on the
part of the accused. Special intent to commit genocide goes well beyond the standard
intent of most domestic criminal trials and, to use a phrase coined by Trial Chamber
judges in Stakid, prosecutors must demonstrate a “surplus of intent.”16 In our view, this
constitutes one of the main reasons why judges did not uphold full-liability genocide
convictions.17 However, in June 2010 Bosnian Serb Army leaders Vujadin Popovid and
Ljubiša Beara were found guilty of committing genocide at Srebrenica and Žepa in
eastern Bosnia, although this has yet to be upheld by the Appeals Chamber. 18 One
survey question directly addressed criminal intent, asking: “Is historical evidence

15

Krstid (Trial Chamber), §571.

16

Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakid, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 31 July 2003.

§520.
17

We accept there are also other reasons, including the prosecution case against defendants

appearing before the Tribunal and the available evidence presented thus far. For an account of
several cases where the charge of genocide was rejected at the ICTY, see Hayden (2008).
18

Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popovid et al. (Case IT-05-88) Trial Chamber Judgment, IT-05-88-T, 10

June 2010.
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relevant for proving mens rea in genocide cases; i.e., demonstrating that a perpetrator
was aware of a wider policy or plan to destroy a group in whole or in part?”19 Our
expectation was that there would be a strong division between prosecutors sanctioning
this statement and defense attorneys categorically opposing it, as occurred above in the
question on motivation for crimes. Instead there was a statistically significant
consensus.

Is historical evidence relevant for proving mens rea in genocide cases; i.e., demonstrating that a
perpetrator was aware of a wider policy or plan to destroy a group in whole or in part?
(All respondents)

5%
4%

45%
17%

Highly relevant (45%)
Somewhat relevant (28%)
Somewhat irrelevant (17%)
Highly irrelevant (4%)
No opinion (5%)

28%

Figure 7

Breaking these figures down further showed that respondents from the Office of the
Prosecutor were more inclined towards viewing historical evidence as highly or
somewhat relevant for special intent, but not by an overwhelming margin over defense
counsel or expert witnesses.
19

We neglected to add the words “as such”, as included in the official Genocide Convention.

While we regret this error, we do not feel that the omission influenced the responses greatly.
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Is historical evidence relevant for proving mens rea in genocide cases?
(Prosecution, Defense and Expert Witnesses)
60%
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Prosecution
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0%
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38%

33%

25%

4%

0%

Expert Witness

46%

23%

0%

15%

15%

Figure 8

Conceivably as a result of Trial Chamber judgments such as Tadid and the Rule 98bis
decision in Slobodan Miloševid that confirmed the relevance of historical evidence to
proving intent to commit crimes against humanity and genocide, this view has now
become widely acknowledged. Yet why do defense respondents surveyed see a link
between history and special intent, given their willingness to object energetically to
aspects of Tribunal jurisprudence? We offer some thoughts on this question in our
conclusions.

IV. Assessing the Outcomes of Historical Evidence

In this section we review responses that assess the historical expertise presented at the
ICTY, the Tribunal’s attitude toward such evidence, and the Tribunal’s utilization of that
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evidence. Although the quantifiable survey approach limited the research team to a
small number of questions with closed answer sets, the final question invited
respondents to add prose comments of unlimited length, which we will summarize at
the conclusion of this section.

One series of questions elicited opinions concerning the contribution of experts toward
the creation of a historical record of the conflicts and their historical context.
"In their testimony to the ICTY, historians have provided important information on..."
90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

Prosecution
Defense
Expert Witness

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
TRUE

FALSE

No opinion

Q.1 History of Yugoslavia

TRUE

FALSE

Q.2 Ideology of politcal movements

Figure 9a

No opinion
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"In their reports and testimony to the ICTY, historians have provided important information on..."
70%

60%

50%

40%
Prosecution
Defense
Expert Witness

30%

20%

10%

0%
TRUE

FALSE

No opinion

Q.3 Hidden meanings of political statements

TRUE

FALSE

No opinion

Q.4 Organization of military and paramilitary units

Figure 9b
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"In their testimony to the ICTY, historians have provided important information on..."
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Q.5: The authority structure of political parties
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Figure 9c

Prosecution, defense and expert respondents tended to agree with these statements,
but with two significant limitations. First, for each question, a larger proportion of
prosecution respondents than defense respondents agreed. Second, the extent to
which prosecution and defense respondents diverged depended on the degree to which
the questions might relate to the responsibility for inciting conflict and the crimes
against humanity. In response to the most general historical questions (1, 6), as well as
factual questions about the parties to the conflict without reference to ideology or
intent (4, 5), respondents tended to agree. Regarding the history and ideology of
political movements (2), agreement between prosecution and defense diminished.
Prosecution and expert respondents significantly agreed, while defense responses were
more evenly split. On the one question that went directly to the intent of political
leaders (3), prosecution and defense responses diverged widely.
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A second group of questions assessed the contribution of the parties in the ICTY
processes. First we will consider trial chamber judgments, bearing in mind that the
evidence provided by historical experts represents just one aspect of that available to
judges in rendering conclusions of a historiographic nature. The most general
evaluation of the historical aspect of the trial chambers’ accounts was elicited by asking
respondents to react to the statement: “In its judgments, the ICTY has produced an
accurate and comprehensive account of the armed conflicts of the 1990’s in the former
Yugoslavia.” The responses revealed a profound disagreement between defense and
prosecution respondents:

Pros.%

Defense%

Witness%

Strongly Agree

13

0

23

Agree

48

16

38

Neutral

23

16

8

Disagree

10

48

15

6

16

15

Strongly Disagree

Figure 10

A second question sought confirmation of a more limited claim: “In its judgments, the
ICTY has given important insights into the origins and causes of the armed conflict in the
former Yugoslavia”. Although respondents were generally more willing to acknowledge
the validity of this claim, disagreement remains striking:
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Pros.%

Defense%

Witness%

Strongly Agree
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0

15

Agree
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Neutral
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0

Disagree

3

20

23

Strongly Disagree

3
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8

No Opinion

0

0

8

Figure 11

Now we consider the historical expert evidence brought by the prosecution and
defense. Two questions sought overall assessments of these contributions: “Historical
evidence led by the prosecution/defense has provided important insights into violations
of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia.”

Pros.% Defense%

Witness%

Strongly Agree
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Agree
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Neutral
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prosecution

Disagree

6

24

15

Strongly Disagree

3
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8
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Agree
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(2) Evidence led by the

Neutral

29

37.5

15

defense

Disagree

19

4

15

3

8

8

16

0

31

Strongly Disagree
No opinion
Figure 12
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The responses revealed a profound yet asymmetrical disagreement along partisan lines.
Question 1 (concerning evidence led by the prosecution) elicited the most extreme
divergence of any question in the survey. In response to Question 2 (evidence led by
the defense), far more defense respondents agreed than disagreed, but prosecution
respondents as well tended to agree (albeit by a smaller margin) that defense experts
had contributed insights into IHL violations. Speculatively, this asymmetry could reflect
a belief on the part of some prosecution respondents that bias displayed by defense
experts from the former Yugoslavia may occasionally reveal a state of mind or historical
narrative prevalent in the region in line with prosecution contentions.

This concern is related to the issue addressed in two further questions, concerning “the
degree to which contextual expert witnesses called by the prosecution (a)/defense (b)
have been appropriately prepared for testimony in the courtroom.” These questions
address broader perceptions regarding how adequate the experts for the parties have
been. This issue, in turn, arises out of two primary concerns. The first involves relative
access to resources, including the best experts available, due to financial, staffing or
time restrictions, or possibly to fear of stigmatization from appearing for one or the
other party. Defense teams have, on multiple occasions, protested a lack of “equality of
arms” vis-à-vis the prosecution in these respects, while prosecution teams have also
encountered difficulty in identifying and engaging qualified experts. The second
concern has to with experts’ understanding of their role in the process (e.g., neutral vs.
partisan; to answer questions vs. expounding upon a topic; required documentation).
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The degree to which contextual expert witnesses called by the prosecution have been appropriately
prepared for testimony in the courtroom
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Figure 13(a)

33

The degree to which contextual expert witnesses called by the defense have been appropriately
prepared for testimony in the courtroom
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Figure 13(b)

Prosecution and defense respondents differed asymmetrically on this issue. Most
strikingly, while a majority of prosecution respondents felt that prosecution experts had
been “appropriately prepared,” only 17% of defense respondents believed that their
own experts had been “appropriately prepared.” This may reflect the concern of
defense respondents regarding equality of arms at the ICTY. Most of those defense and
prosecution respondents who were willing to offer an opinion about the preparation of
experts for the other side acknowledged that those experts were at least “somewhat
prepared,” although a larger proportion of prosecution respondents considered defense
experts “not appropriately prepared.” This asymmetry may be interpreted as a form of
prosecution concurrence with defense respondents’ reluctance to consider defense
experts as having been “appropriately prepared.”

Three questions evaluated the effectiveness of expertise in terms of its reception by the
trial chambers. Two of these questions, “How receptive are ICTY judges to the
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testimony of historians serving as expert witnesses called by the defense
(a)/prosecution (b)?,” elicited a striking pattern of asymmetrical differences between
defense and prosecution respondents.
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Figure 14

No respondent from the prosecution or defense acknowledged that judges were highly
receptive to defense experts. Remarkably, defense respondents were more likely than
prosecution respondents to consider judges “Unreceptive” or “Highly Unreceptive” to
defense experts. This confirms defense responses indicating that, generally, their
experts were not as adequately prepared as prosecution experts, which, in turn, follows
from the defense perception of an “inequality of arms” in the ICTY’s proceedings. These
impressions are strengthened by responses concerning judges’ receptivity to
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prosecution witnesses. Defense respondents tended to agree with prosecution
respondents that judges were “Somewhat Receptive” or “Highly Receptive” to
prosecution expertise.

The sense that defense respondents perceive an overall bias on the part of the Court
and less adequate preparation of their side’s expert witnesses is further supported by
responses to a further question: “When the historian expert witnesses of the
prosecution and defense contradict one another, how do judges decide between their
competing historical accounts?”
How Do Judges Decide Between Competing Historical Accounts?
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Figure 15

This question elicited striking disagreement between prosecution and expert
respondents, on the one hand, and defense respondents, on the other. By a wide
margin, the former felt that this depended on the case. However, half of the defense
respondents (a majority of those who offered an opinion) believed that judges generally
give the doubt to the prosecution.
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Two questions in True-False format considered speculation regarding motives of the
prosecution and defense in introducing historical evidence to meet perceived
weaknesses in their cases:
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Defence% Witness%

A) Prosecutors lead historical
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evidence [e.g., forensics,

in order to mount a tu quoque
defense20

Figure 16

While we expected the survey to dispel the impression that such views might be
widespread, it suggested in fact that each is entrenched within one party to the process,
and that the parties are in striking disagreement with one another in these regards.

A further series of questions addressed additional perspectives bearing on the
effectiveness of modes of introducing expert evidence.

20

As defined at the ICTY, “The defence of tu quoque concerns the allegation that the opposing

party to the conflict committed similar atrocities” and/or “the allegation that that party was
responsible for the commencement of the said conflict” (“Decision on Evidence of the Good
Character of the Accused and the Defence of Tu Quoque,” The Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskid et
al., IT-95-16-T, 17 February 1999). The admissibility of a tu quoque defense has been generally
denied in international criminal law since Nuremberg.
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One asked whether internal OTP staff experts or external experts have been more
effective.
Which have been more effective as expert witnesses in the Trial Chamber?
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Figure 17

While a plurality of prosecution respondents considered internal and external experts
equally effective, half of defense respondents believed that external experts were more
effective, and few acknowledged internal experts to be more effective. It is possible
that some defense respondents used this question as a surrogate for another un-posed
question which, in retrospect, should therefore have been included: whether it is
appropriate, in terms of fairness and objectivity, for OTP staff members to appear as
expert background witnesses. Some defense attorneys have argued strenuously against
this practice, including President of the ICTY Defense Attorneys’ Association, Michael G.
Karnavas: “I have objected to calling expert witnesses from the OTP. They are not
independent, but have been part of the prosecution team for years. They are not going
to jeopardize their position by going against the case an STA is trying to build. These
prosecution analysts-turned-experts are usually engaged in the stages of drafting the
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indictment, gathering the evidence, and presenting evidence. Their reports mirror the
prosecution theory as reflected in the indictment, and one can hardly claim these
reports to be objective.”21

A second question asked which has greater significance for the outcome of a trial:
expert testimony led in the Trial Chamber or expert reports submitted to the Trial
Chamber. On this question, which does not go to issues that might be considered
contentious among the parties, all categories of respondent were in essential accord,
with a majority believing live testimony to have a greater impact. While reports, with
their associated documentation, gave the Trial Chambers the ability to analyze experts’
positions, underlying arguments and documentation in greater detail and depth, and to
prepare carefully for oral questioning of experts, respondents nevertheless felt that in
the end it was the oral testimony of the experts that carried the greatest weight.

A final question addressed one of the most important aspects of the ICTY’s legacy for
the region of conflict: “Have historical discussions at the ICTY enhanced or undermined
the Tribunal's legitimacy in the former Yugoslavia?” The results revealed a profound
difference of perception, with prosecution and defense responses almost diametrically
opposed. While a plurality of prosecution respondents (42%) believed the ICTY’s
legitimacy to have been enhanced by historical discussions at the ICTY, a majority of
defense respondents (62.5%) believed that the ICTY’s legitimacy had been undermined
by this discussion. The smaller number of expert responses was almost evenly divided.
Most prosecution staff members are from outside the region of the former Yugoslavia
while a significant number of defense team members are from within the region; it
remains beyond the scope of the present investigation, however, to determine which
position is in better accord with public opinion in the various regions of the former
Yugoslavia.

21

Author interview (Richard Wilson), June 2007.
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Many respondents availed themselves of the opportunity to add comments, some brief,
others extensive, in the text field provided at the conclusion of the survey. We cannot
capture the full scope and richness of those qualitative comments here, but will note
several of the issues that were brought to our attention, including some leitmotifs.

Beginning from the more critical comments, some respondents believe the use of
historical experts to be entirely inappropriate. One response tied the utilization of
historical expertise to a flawed prosecution strategy of investigations and prosecutions.
Instead of taking a pragmatic approach, gathering sufficient evidence to convict
perpetrators in a rapid and cost effective manner, over-expansive investigations and allencompassing indictments have led to excessively long investigations and trials.
Another asserted that insufficient time has elapsed since the events for an objective,
comprehensive and balanced historical account to be compiled.

One recurring perception was that historical expertise has skewed the historical record
through intentional or inadvertent bias. On the one hand, two respondents speculated
that the methodology, conceptual framework (e.g., concept of “nation”) or area of
interest/specialization of a particular expert may have distorted the results. On the
other hand, multiple respondents expressed the view that expert witnesses typically
favored one side or the other, or were chosen to espouse a favored point of view.
According to two respondents, the favored view within the Office of the Prosecutor
might change from one case to the next depending on the ethnic group of the accused,
while one perceived courtroom historical expertise as having become a continuation of
the military conflict by other means. According to one, such effects could be viewed as
one result of the prosecution strategy of targeting investigation/trial teams for
particular “perpetrator groups,” rather than for the events of a particular region.
Another asserted that had the prosecution more effectively employed its in-house
expertise on the former Yugoslavia and centralized that expertise in the investigative
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and trial preparation process, a more coherent prosecution position on the history of
the conflicts would have been achieved. Yet another suggested that it might have been
preferable to engage experts not by the two sides, but in a role similar to an amicus
curiae. Finally, one respondent noted the inherent limitation on the ability of judges to
evaluate expert evidence, and of lawyers to evaluate and exploit such evidence, noting
that both judges and lawyers will prefer simpler solutions, while the latter will favor
versions that support their particular case.

Multiple comments from respondents who participated for the defense contained
explicit claims of institutional bias relevant to expertise, including claims that there was
no equality of arms, a de facto burden of proof on the defense, and that judges gave the
benefit of the doubt to prosecution experts. One respondent claimed that an
accusatorial climate, created and fostered by the prosecution in the former Yugoslavia,
had chilled the willingness of qualified witnesses to present a historical narrative at odds
with the prosecution’s. One defense attorney asserted that the Court’s decision to
accept hearsay evidence and to basically ignore obvious perjury set the stage for a
system that could not produce an accurate history of the events and was not likely
produce justice either.

In contrast to the largely negative perceptions expressed above, a smaller number of
remarks, in some cases by the same respondents who voiced critical comments,
affirmed the value of historical (broadly defined) expertise for the success of the ICTY’s
efforts. Inter alia, one noted that the employment of expert witnesses has allowed for a
large body of previously unavailable documentation to be revealed, studied and
analyzed by experts called by the prosecution and defense for the purpose of these
trials. This person added that the use made of this body of evidence by future historians
may eventually lead to a fuller understanding of these events than one could reasonably
expect from the expert presentations prepared within the context (and limitations) of
specific cases before the ICTY. Another noted that the employment of experts allowed
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for the inclusion of relevant evidence from outside the former Yugoslavia, e.g., parallel
examples of the use of mass media to spread falsehoods, so as to provide a perspective
for better understanding similar events in the Balkans.

We had expected to receive comments asserting the value of expert witnesses in
educating judges who had no previous experience with events in the former Yugoslavia
and the history of the region. However, as cited above, the one comment that touched
upon this topic asserted that, despite such testimony, some judges and lawyers
appeared to have an incomplete grasp of basic facts and background information even
after serving on more than one case at the ICTY; although the evidence of experts can
be of assistance in remedying this inherent weakness, it can be difficult for the judges to
sort out conflicting claims by expert witnesses called by the two sides. Another
respondent, echoing this same theme, stated that different trial chambers during
simultaneous trials might reach differing and often opposing conclusions.

V. Correlation Analysis

We ran correlation tests on our data to determine whether there were any correlations
between the responses and 1) the length of service at the ICTY; 2) prior knowledge of
the former Yugoslavia; and 3) prior experience of a criminal justice system. Given the
non-parametric nature of our data, we ran a Spearman correlation test to examine the
relationship between the time of service at the ICTY variable and the rest of the issues
raised in the survey.22

22

In a Spearman test, an ideal +1 or -1 correlation occurs when each of the variables is a perfect

monotone function of the others. A positive correlation occurs when the significance value is
smaller than +.05, and a negative correlation occurs when the significant value is smaller than .05.
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While the formal tests resulted in no significant value for the overall survey, the
following chart that calculates the mean of each question visualizes some disparities
among the groups based on the length of time they served. In other words, it illustrates
the relationship between participants’ responses to questions in relation to their length
of association with the ICTY. Although Figure 18 aggregates information and tells us
little about the overall survey, the most significant aspect here is the variation in some
responses depending on length of association with the Tribunal. We divided the length
of association into four categories: 1) those who worked less than one year; 2) those
who worked from 1 to 2 years; 3) those who worked from 2 to 5 years; and finally 4)
those who worked for more than 5 years. The numbers on the X axis refer to issues
raised in the survey (i.e., each question in the survey) while the numbers on the Y axis
indicate the variation in opinions expressed. The y axis values range between 1 and 5;
that is, from “strongly agree” to “no opinion.” The same process was applied to Figure
19, but it included what we considered to be the most controversial questions.

The divide is wider and more obvious between the two groups with the least amount of
service (“less than 1 year” and “1-2 years” of association) compared with the other two
groups who served longer (“2-5 years” and “more than 5 years” of association). In other
words, it does suggest a variation in their responses based on the time variable;
however, the level of significance varies depending on which groups are being
compared. Those who worked longer, for example, from 2 to 5 years or longer,
generally show more agreement upon issues presented in the survey. Major
disagreements remain between the groups with less than 2 years of service and groups
with 2 or more years’ involvement.
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Figure 18: Responses to All Questions Nos. 10-30

Figure 19: Responses to Selected Questions

Correlation tests were repeated with the other two variables (prior knowledge of the
former Yugoslavia; and prior experience of a criminal justice system) and the results did
not show any statistically significant correlations. While these tests show no
correlations, they do still indicate something of value — that the replies of individuals
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with little experience of a criminal justice system or the former Yugoslavia do not differ
considerably from those of more experienced individuals. However, participants’ views
do seem to change substantially by virtue of exposure to the ICTY’s work over time,
suggesting that socialization in the norms and conventional views of the ICTY is a more
determining factor in changing opinion than prior experience of legal institutions or the
region.

VI. Conclusions

In contrast to Hannah Arendt’s (1965:91) austere legal minimalism where history is
deemed not legally relevant, the parties to ICTY trials do have clear legal motivations to
include historical evidence; that is, they include this type of evidence because it allows
them to achieve certain legal objectives in the trial. On these issues, there was much
more consensus between prosecution and defense respondents than on questions
eliciting evaluation of the outcome of the Tribunal’s historical forays. In part, this could
be because the parties share some legal objectives and institutional conditions. The
rules of admissibility of evidence in international criminal tribunals grant both parties
similar latitude in developing their cases. Both parties appear before international
judges who, at least in the beginning, require historical and cultural contextualization to
make sense of the evidence. Prosecutors and defense attorneys perceive the actual
crimes similarly (as “widespread and systematic”, as “complex”) and accept the same
categorical imperative to use historical evidence. This consensus on the repercussions
of the crimes for the legal process continues when the questions turn to the legal
conceptions of international criminal law itself. There is strong agreement that the
collective dimension of crimes against humanity affects the use of historical evidence.

Despite these areas of agreement, however, historical evidence clearly assumes a
distinct legal relevance for each party in the adversarial process. This is perhaps to be
expected, as Marc Galanter (1974:97) described some time ago the different legal
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strategies adopted by “one-shotters” and “repeat players” as they played the “litigation
game.”23 At the ICTY, prosecutors are more likely to occupy the “repeat player” end of
the continuum, taking advantage of the benefits that accrue (e.g., expertise, advance
intelligence etc). Prosecutors are using historical evidence to build their theory of a
case and to demonstrate the criminal intention of the accused, especially in cases where
they must prove special intent to commit genocide. In qualitative interviews conducted
before this survey, it became apparent that some prosecutors saw in historical evidence
the opportunity to demonstrate how a nationalist ideology (e.g., Greater Croatia,
Greater Serbia) engendered an enduring desire to hold a particular territory or
subordinate another ethnic/national group within a state or territory.

The fact that a majority of defense counsel were willing to subscribe to the potential link
between history, mental state and genocide invites further discussion, since this would
appear to be against their clients’ interests. Certainly, history is of greater intrinsic
concern to the accused than the prosecutors, and historical treatises in the courtroom
seem to play well with an audience back in the region (Tosid 2007). Perhaps defense
attorneys perceive an opportunity to support a “chaos defense,” or, conversely, to
undercut prosecution arguments that there was a long-standing desire on the part of
nationalists to commit genocide. Or perhaps, given that sentencing and judgment
occur simultaneously at the ICTY, they see an opportunity to demonstrate how any
attacks constituted justifiable reprisals in response to past provocations. Presenting the
history of nationalist ideology in the former Yugoslavia, then, may assist the prosecution
and the defense cases, albeit in different ways. It helps prosecutors develop their case
theory and elaborate their narrative on genocidal intent, but it also allows defense to
lead evidence that may sew uncertainty regarding issues of ideology and superior
responsibility.

23

We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the relevance of Galanter’s ideas to

interpreting the survey results.
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Turning now to responses that assess the historical accounts produced or presented at
the ICTY, and their reception both at the ICTY and in the former Yugoslavia, one striking
generalization stands out. On questions that concern the fairness/objectivity of the
ICTY’s process, judges’ receptivity to evidence, and the accuracy, objectivity and
comprehensiveness of the historical accounts created at the ICTY, prosecution and
defense responses diverged widely. .

If the broader “chapeau” goals of the ICTY have been to promote reconciliation in the
former Yugoslavia and deter future conflict by providing accountability that is perceived
in the region to be fair and objective, and which is so well documented that it will be
resistant to later revisionism, then the results of this survey do not bear out these wider
goals. While parties to an adversarial process must vigorously advocate their respective
positions in individual cases, for these goals to be achieved, then the parties must
approach, at least gradually, a common understanding on issues relating to
effectiveness and fairness of the process itself. Yet, this survey suggests that over more
than 15 years of ICTY practice, at least in matters related to historical inquiry, the parties
have not achieved such a common ground which could form a strong basis for
acceptance of the Tribunal’s work in the regions of conflict. If we speculate that those
views which are preponderant among defense respondents reflect opinions that are
widespread in the former Yugoslavia, then we must conclude the Tribunal’s legacy in
that region, at least in regard to the historical record that it has created, will not be a
salient one. We must also conclude that the ICTY’s international legacy as a pioneering
institution of international justice will be diminished at least in this regard.

Ultimately, the multifarious historical accounts created within the framework of the
ICTY will be available for evaluation by future generations of researchers, and will not
stand or fall on the basis of assessments by the immediate participants in the trials. The
ICTY’s contribution to historical inquiry into the recent conflicts, moreover, will be but
one of many. As articulated by one expert witness:
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“The process of international criminal justice at the ICTY, and the
testimony and evidence that it has produced has added significantly to
the available historical evidence concerning events in the former
Yugoslavia during the final decades of the 20th century. The use made of
this body of evidence by future historians may eventually lead to a fuller
understanding of the critical questions about these events than one could
reasonably expect from the expert presentations prepared within the
context (and limitations) of specific cases before the court.”

Reviewing the results of the survey, we see some clear implications for the extant
literature on the ICTY’s ability to facilitate reconciliation among the population of the
former Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular. The edited volume by
Stover and Weinstein (2004) offers a number of examples (e.g., Mostar and Prijedor in
Bosnia and Vukovar in Croatia) in support of its contention that international trials have
little impact on reconciliation and social reconstruction. Subotid (2009:6) finds evidence
to support these claims in her elucidation of how political actors in Bosnia, Croatia and
Serbia often hijack the ICTY’s work for their own domestic agenda, thus jeopardizing the
legitimacy and effectiveness of the international justice institution.24 Kostid (2007:355)
concludes that “in the case of persisting group insecurities and ethnonational
mobilization, different ethnonational communities, instead of wholeheartedly
embracing justice and truth from international or hybrid tribunals, are more likely to
view them selectively and on the basis of their particular definition of war, defenders
and perpetrators.” From this perspective, the expectation that the ICTY can promote
reconciliation, at least in the near term, by establishing an accurate historical account
that is acceptable to all and resistant to revisionism may itself be misplaced.

24

See also Klarin (2009) which also assesses the ICTY’s Outreach Program.
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Our research shows that the international criminal proceedings, based as they are in the
adversarial process, may enhance an oppositional mentality, polarize historical accounts
further and widen the chasm rather than construct a common bridge between
populations. However, we note more recent attitudinal research in Bosnia by
Nettelfield (2010) challenging the emerging negative consensus. Lara Nettelfield claims
that previous scholars have overlooked the ways in which the ICTY has promoted
democratization and, if not exactly “reconciliation”, then at least the internalization of
basic human rights norms, by creating new post-war political identities based on the
rule of law and participation (p.15). Our view is that these questions are temporally
defined, and the impact of the ICTY on reconciliation, rule of law and historical denial in
the former Yugoslavia cannot be fully known until some years after its work is complete.
We would observe at this point that the fact that the actual legal proceedings at the
ICTY seem to push the actors further apart on central historical issues does not bode
well for the ICTY’s legacy.

Nevertheless, the contribution of the ICTY is unique and non-replicable in its
methodology, access to information, and in the nature of its products. It is also
distinctive in its potential to positively or negatively affect reconciliation and historical
debate in the public spaces in the regions of conflict. It is for both of these reasons that
we have attempted to contribute to the project of assessing its successes and failures.
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